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Abstract
This paper looks at the relationship between negative news and stock markets in times of global crisis, such as the 2008/
2009 period. We analysed one year of front page banner headlines of three financial newspapers, the Wall Street Journal,
Financial Times, and Il Sole24ore to examine the influence of bad news both on stock market volatility and dynamic
correlation. Our results show that the press and markets influenced each other in generating market volatility and in
particular, that the Wall Street Journal had a crucial effect both on the volatility and correlation between the US and foreign
markets. We also found significant differences between newspapers in their interpretation of the crisis, with the Financial
Times being significantly pessimistic even in phases of low market volatility. Our results confirm the reflexive nature of stock
markets. When the situation is uncertain and unpredictable, market behaviour may even reflect qualitative, big picture, and
subjective information such as streamers in a newspaper, whose economic and informative value is questionable.
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Introduction
Global financial crises have always followed similar patterns
throughout history (e.g., [1]), including the crucial role of financial
press (e.g., [2]; [3]; [4]; [5]). From the bursting of the Tulip buble
in 1637 in the Netherlands to the dot.com bubble in 2001 in
America, the financial press has significantly influenced the stock
market, often amplifying the cognitive bias and herd behaviour of
investors (e.g., [6]; [7]).
This behaviour may depend on the strong sensitivity of investors
towards bad news. Recent studies have shown that market
responses to good and bad news is asymmetric. Indeed, investors
are more sensitive to negative news, especially when the market is
dominated by uncertainty and unpredictability, and this is an
important source of market volatility (e.g., [8]; [9]; [10]; [11]; [12];
[13]; [14]). [15] found that stock prices overreacted to bad news
even in good times and underreacted to good news in bad times.
Similarly [16] found that bad news has a bigger impact both in
phases of market expansion and contraction. Moreover, the press
may induce a ‘‘framing effect’’, according to which investors react
disproportionally to negative news especially when information
source is authoritative (e.g., [17]; [18]; [19]). In this case,
communication research indicates that the perceived authorita-
tiveness of news sources implies higher trust in the news from these
sources ([20]). This effect has been empirically confirmed by a
survey on 321 traders and 63 financial journalists from leading
banks and financial news providers in the European foreign
exchange market ([21]) and a recent case-study on three Dutch
banks during the recent financial crisis ([14]).
While the importance of these aspects has been largely
underestimated in economics (e.g., [22], [23]), they have been
recently investigated in empirical finance (e.g., [24]; [25]; [26]),
with interesting parallels with recent sociological investigation on
financial markets (e.g., [27]). Unlike the efficient market hypoth-
esis, these studies show that investors are largely influenced by the
media, rumours and gossip even in ‘normal’ market periods, where
prices should contain all necessary information (e.g., [24]; [28]). If
this is so, we would expect that, in times of financial crisis such as
the 2008–2009 period, not only would the investors’ overreaction
to bad news have drastically influenced market behaviour, it could
even lead investors to overestimate the relevance of not strictly
economic, general information. Indeed, in these situations, market
prices and other relevant quantitative data on markets are even
more variedly interpreted by investors than in normal periods
([27]). Even qualitative, big picture, subjective information, such as
streamers in a newspaper, can become relevant in these cases.
To look at this, we investigated the relationship between
negative news in financial newspapers and volatility and correla-
tion between stock markets during the recent global financial crisis.
We analysed one year of front page banner headlines of three
financial newspapers, such as the Wall Street Journal, Financial
Times, and Il Sole24ore from 1st September 2008 to 1st
September 2009, when the recent financial crisis exploded
globally. We created an index of bad news per newspaper on a
daily base and studied the relation between this index and the
closing values of three stock market indexes, such as the DowJones,
FTSE and MIB. We considered these stock markets as they were
more domestically affected by these newspapers, while comparing
their dynamics was essential to look at equivalences and
differences across markets and between different press cultures.
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Our work has important differences compared with previous
work. First, unlike previous studies in empirical finance (e.g., [25]),
we focused on the last financial crisis as we wanted to better
understand the fabric of pessimism that dominated the last years
worldwide. Secondly, rather than considering specific market
information, as reported in specialized columns, we looked at the
impact of general information provided by front page headlines of
the financial press. Indeed, front page headlines are crucial in
summarizing the meaning, tone and importance of the news but
are not expected to contain true, precise and detailed information
about economic facts, unlike specialized columns. This is because:
(i) headline information is too succinct and (ii) front page messages
heavily reflect specific information strategies of the newspapers,
which are mainly concerned with impressing and attracting the
reader. Furthermore, unlike [24], we did not restrict our interest to
strictly speaking financial news but considered economic informa-
tion in general. Unlike [29] and [25], we did not focus on precise
information concerned with specific stocks but rather looked at
general information, which reflects more interpretation than
objective details. Thirdly, while studies on the impact of social
media on stock markets have recently been carried out that focus
on similar crisis periods (e.g.,[30]; [31]), our idea was that, in a
situation of financial turmoil, the authoritative columns of certain
influential financial newspapers and so also traditional media
could have a strong impact on the investors’ mood. Finally, by
comparing three newspapers and their respective stock markets,
we also wanted to measure differences in interpretation of this
global crisis and consider certain country-specific cultural features
of the press (e.g., [32]).
To our knowledge, this is the first work that extends the analysis
of the impact of financial press from market volatility to market
correlation. Combining volatility and correlation was key to: (i)
understanding if bad news has had an effect on the growing
interdependence of markets, which is presumably correlated with
crisis periods (e.g., [9]; [33]); (ii) looking at the impact of bad news
not only from the point of view of risk but also from that of risk
diversification. We estimated the volatility and correlation
dynamics using generalized autoregressive conditional heteroske-
dasticity (GARCH) models (see [34]) with dynamic conditional
correlation ([35]). Secondly, we estimated the dynamic relation-
ship between market volatility/correlation and bad news by using
vector autoregressive models (VAR). We also performed a
Granger-causality test to verify whether bad news time series
had predictive value for market volatility/correlation ([36]). A
strong quantitative approach to typical sociological and qualitative
factors, such as investors’ mood and media pessimism, was
intended to favour cross-fertilization between empirical finance
(usually addressed to quantitative facts, but was little concerned
with sociological aspects) and sociology of financial markets
(strongly concerned with sociological aspects of markets, but
poorly interested in macro quantitative market consequences).
This integration is essential to understand complex institutional,
socio-economic artefacts, such as financial markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 illustrates
the background and our research hypotheses. Sect. 3 presents our
dataset and illustrates the bad news index that we used to measure
the relationship between newspapers and markets. It also shows
data on market volatility and correlation. Sect. 4 introduces the
model we built to examine the impact of newspapers on markets.
Sect. 5 focuses on causal statistical relationships between the press
and markets. Sect. 6 provides a robustness and sensitivity analysis,
while the last Sect. summarizes our main findings and discusses
certain limitations.
Background and Hypotheses
Many studies in finance have shown that stock market prices
incorporate financial press information (e.g., [37]; [38]; [39]).
While this may be expected in cases of quantitative information on
important economic statistics, such as those regularly released by
important institutional agencies (e.g., [40]; [41]; [42]; [43], [44];
[45,46]), it is less likely to find a positive impact of qualitative
information, such as journalists’ opinion or reports of market
rumours, which is subjective ([47]; [28]). Nevertheless, empirical
evidence is also growing in this area.
For instance, [29] examined Dartboard, a monthly column of
the Wall Street Journal reporting analysts’ recommendations, from
1988 to 1990. Results showed that for the two days following the
publication, average positive abnormal returns of 4 percent of the
stock recommended were partially reversed only within 25 trading
days. Similarly, [25] examined Abreast of the Market, a popular
column of the Wall Street Journal, from 1984 to 1999. It is worth
noting that, unlike Dartboard, which asks market analysts’
opinions, this column is closer to entertainment than information.
The author found that even qualitative information, such as the
fraction of negative words in this column, was incorporated in
aggregate market valuations. More specifically, results showed that
high level of pessimism robustly predicted downward pressure on
market prices and that high or low values of pessimism helped to
predict high market trading volumes. More recently, [48]
examined 30 years of ‘‘Abreast of the Market’’ and showed that
even specific columnists can influence stock market behaviour.
[49] extended this type of analysis by addressing the impact of
negative words in all Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones News
Service stories about individual S&P 500 firms from 1980 to 2004.
Results showed that negative words in the financial press
forecasted low firm earnings and that stock market prices
incorporated the information embedded in negative words only
with a slight delay. This would confirm that bad news is
assimilated faster than good ones in market behaviour (e.g., [19]).
Other studies showed that this effect was even true for
unconventional, un-specialized media, whose information should
be less relevant for investors. For example, [24] examined the
effect of more than 1.5 million messages posted on Yahoo! Finance
and Raging Bull about 45 companies in the Dow Jones Industrial
Average and the Dow Jones Internet Index, by measuring
bullishness. They found that stock messages helped to predict
market volatility both on a daily base and also within the same
trading day. More specifically, they found that higher message
postings predicted negative subsequent returns. They also found
that disagreement between the posted messages was associated
with increased trading volume. More recently, [31] found that
Twitter mood predicted more than 80% of daily volatility of
closing values of the Dow Jones Industrial Average. This would
confirm Nofsinger’s argument that social mood may cause an
increase of decisions biased by optimism or pessimism that could
considerably influence aggregate investment and business activity,
even reflecting future economic activities ([50]).
The idea that markets are influenced by reflexivity mechanisms
has been explained by recent sociological investigation, which has
mostly examined trading activities in specific organizational
contexts (e.g., [51]; [23], [52]; [27]). Unfortunately, these studies
underestimated the importance of understanding how context-
specific empirical cases could result in aggregate quantitative
market data. Our aim was to fill this gap by formulating and
empirically testing certain hypotheses on the influence of press
information on stock market behaviour comparatively, so as to
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consider possible institutional diversity in the relation between
financial press and markets.
Our research hypotheses were as follows. First, [11] and [28]
showed that investors, even those following long-term strategies,
are more influenced by negative news as they reduce the difficulty
in predicting future outcomes by overestimating the impact of
current information (see also [9]; [12]; [13]; [16]). This was also
found in experimental and economic psychology (e.g., [22]). Our
hypothesis is that the importance of these psychological factors
could dramatically increase during financial turmoil as investors
tend to disqualify the reliability of prices and even the well-
functioning of the markets and are more sensitive to other sources
of information, including newspaper headlines. Indeed, the fact
that information is subject to profit maximisation by newspapers
should make investors cautious of these sources ([53]). Further-
more, unlike efficient market hypothesis, experimental research
has shown that, in uncertainty, investors tend to overestimate their
informational gap and are sensitive to any additional information,
including subjective one (e.g.,[54]). Therefore, our first hypothesis
(H1) is that bad news published by financial newspapers could
negatively influence the daily volatility of financial markets during
this period.
Secondly, although most financial crises have had an interna-
tional impact in the past, the 2008–2009 crisis was truly global as
financial markets are now extremely interdependent. Indeed,
modern investment technologies allow investors to make millions
of operations per time unit, at any time and anywhere (e.g., [55]).
In this situation, we expect that the pessimistic messages of
Figure 1. Bad news index per newspaper (in rows) from 1st September 2008 to 1st September 2009 on a daily base. Peaks of bad news
are indicated with vertical dashed lines.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067721.g001
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financial newspapers could explain not only market volatility but
also dependence between stock markets. Numerous previous
studies showed that market interdependence tends to be highly
correlated with periods of volatility (e.g., [56]; [22]). For instance,
[9] and [33] suggested that in periods of crisis and high market
volatility, covariation could even include markets that do not have
much in common. [57] suggested that this trend has intensified
especially recently with increasing globalization of investment
strategies. Our hypothesis (H2) is that in periods of turmoil, bad
news could even influence market correlation and has an impact
on global investment strategies. Coherently, we expected that in
this period the interplay of financial markets and the press could
determine a cascade of pessimism that co-influences both
information and market behaviour (H3) (e.g., [58]).
Data
The Bad News Index
Our dataset includes one year of front page banner headlines of
three financial newspapers, namely the Wall Street Journal,
Financial Times and Il Sole24ore, on a daily base. For technical
constraints, i.e., the unavailability of fully accessible electronic
editions or lack of front page news included in electronic versions,
we collected data manually on printed versions of the newspapers.
Budget, time and linguistic constraints did not permit us to
consider other national newspapers or cover longer time periods.
The dataset and a text file, including a full description of the
variables, are available as supplementary information. We
analysed any front page banner headline from 1st September
2008 to 1st September 2009 which conveyed news on the crisis
(not only those expressly related to financial markets) by measuring
the emphasis and the tone of the message. The emphasis was
measured by counting the number of banner columns reporting an
economic news compared with the total number of potentially
available columns, according to standard newspaper layout. We
assumed that the higher the percentage of columns assigned to the
banner headline, the stronger the emphasis of the message was.
The tone was measured by counting the ratio of negative words
over the total words used in the headline text (all included, also
verbs and conjunctions), such as ‘‘recession’’, ‘‘fear’’ and so on. We
assumed that the higher was the number of negative words in the
text, the stronger the pessimism of the message was. For the sake of
simplicity, we did not distinguish the degree of pessimism by
raking the words used.
Our bad news index was based on three types of information.
We considered the number of negative banner headlines on the
crisis, Lk,t, the number of columns, Ck,t, where news were
reported, and the number of negative words reported in the text,
Nk,t, at time t for each journal k~F ,W ,S, where F stands for
Financial Times, W for Wall Street Journal, and S for
IlSole24ore. It is worth noting that the time index t refers to
open-trading days, so time t~1, . . . 250 days. The information
from the press during a non-trading day is reported together with
the information of the first subsequent open-trading day. The
index was build as follows. Let Tk,t be the maximum number of
available columns for a banner headline in the newspaper, then
the relative importance index was
wk,t~
Ck,t
Lk,t
ð1Þ
k~F ,W ,S and t~1, . . . ,T . Then the journal-specific bad news
index, Bk,t, at time t for the journal k, was defined as
Bk,t~wk,t(Tk,t(1zNk,t)) ð2Þ
for k~F ,W ,S and t~1, . . . ,T .
Descriptive Statistics
Figure 1 shows the bad new index per newspaper. The vertical
dashed lines correspond to certain peaks of bad news. The first
peak was on 16th September 2008, the day before it was
announced that Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection, Merrill Lynch agreed to be sold to Bank of America for
50 billion dollars and estimates said that up to 50.000 jobs were at
risk. The second peak was on 24th October 2008 after the
Congressional hearing where Alan Greenspan admitted that he
had put too much faith in the self-correcting power of markets. A
third peak was on 6th April 2009, involving especially the Financial
Times, when the Geithner plan to buy toxic assets was strongly
criticised as a means to provide government ‘‘cash for trash’’ and
UK analysts started to forecast that stagflation was around the
corner.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the bad news index.
Whole Sample First Sub-Sample Second Sub-Sample
Mean St.D. Sk. Kurt. Mean St.D. Sk. Kurt. Mean St.D. Sk. Kurt.
W 0.82 1.07 1.69 6.41 1.09 1.22 1.30 4.74 0.42 0.61 1.47 4.64
F 1.98 2.49 2.73 15.86 2.38 2.22 1.10 3.67 1.40 2.78 4.39 26.79
S 1.17 2.31 4.12 27.41 1.60 2.76 3.56 20.33 0.55 1.19 2.84 11.85
Whole Sample First Sub-Sample Second Sub-Sample
W F S W F S W F S
W 1.00* 0.19* 0.13* 1.00* 0.20* 0.08 1.00* 0.03 20.06
F 1.00* 0.11* 1.00* 0.06 1.00* 0.13
S 1.00* 1.00* 1.00*
First panel: mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis. Second panel: correlation between indexes. The symbol ‘‘*’’ indicates that the null hypothesis of zero
valued Pearson’s correlation was rejected at the 5% significance level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067721.t001
Financial Press and Markets in Times of Crisis
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 July 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 7 | e67721
If we consider bad news dynamics, our one-year sample could
be approximately divided into two sub-samples, i.e., an initial
period characterized by higher concentration of bad news, and a
second one after spring 2009, where bad news were generally less
frequent. By comparing the three newspapers, it is evident that the
Wall Street Journal was more cautious and the Financial Times
published bad news more frequently, also for the second sub-
sample.
Tab. 1 shows mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis
of the bad news index per newspaper. Looking at the mean value
of the bad index, it is worth noting that the Financial Times was
more pessimistic than the other newspapers. On the other hand, if
we consider the deviation from the mean (skewness) and the
extreme values (kurtosis), Il Sole24Ore showed higher excess
pessimism. The Wall Street Journal was more cautious throughout
the entire sample, i.e., it showed both lower means and volatility.
We then distinguished two sub-samples, the first from 1st
September 2008 to 30th March 2009, where the market volatility
was considerably higher, the second from 31st March 2009 to 1st
September 2009, with less volatility. Data showed that pessimism
was generally higher in the first sub-sample. The Financial Times
and Wall Street Journal showed a similar level of excess pessimism,
which was lower than Il Sole24Ore. In the second sub-sample,
where market volatility was lower, the Financial Times showed
both higher levels of pessimism and excess pessimism. This meant
that the Financial Times followed a more critical stance on the
Figure 2. Daily log-returns (first row) of the FTSE, DowJones and MIB indexes from 1st September 2008 to 1st September 2009. Daily
log-volatilities (second row) and correlations (third row), evaluated sequentially over time with a rolling window of t~60 observations and a
smoothing factor l~0:99. In the last row, the red lines indicate the 95% confidence band about the estimated correlations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067721.g002
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crisis, by reporting bad news even in periods of relatively lower
market volatility.
Our database also included the names and amount of journalists
who authored any front page leading article on the crisis. We
calculated a Gini index that measured the concentration of articles
per journalist. Not only did the Financial Times concentrate more
articles with a few journalists (WSJ index took 0.61, while FT took
0.66), it did so especially in the low market volatility period (WSJ
index for the second sub-sample took 0.68, while FT took 0.77).
This meant that the stronger critical stance of Financial Times in
times of lower market volatility was due to a few critical journalists
(see more detailed analysis in Sect. 6).
These findings can be explained by considering certain
historical and institutional differences between the U.S. and UK
financial press (e.g., [59]). [60] has argued that the higher
pessimism of the Financial Times in reflecting the 2008/2009
crisis depended on a mixture of history and contingency (see also
[61]). On the one hand, while the Wall Street Journal has been
historically more devoted to investigation, addressed to an investor
readership and focused on domestic affairs, the Financial Times
has always been more concerned with economic theory and
interpretation and mainly focused on international affairs. This
could explain the stronger sensitivity of the British newspaper
towards a general outlook of the crisis (e.g., the implications of the
financial crisis for the real economy) and its stronger focus on
Table 2. Left: the effect of the bad news indexes on volatility;
Right: the effect of the bad news indexes on correlations.
Impact on volatilities
h h^ t-stat p-val
US
n1 27.6856 2192.1191 0.0000 *
y1,W 0.1332 4.6755 0.0001 *
y1,F 0.0266 2.8681 0.0044 *
y1,S 0.0354 2.8001 0.0551
UK
n2 27.7634 2202.5992 0.0000 *
y2,W 0.1198 5.0512 0.0001 *
y2,F 0.0323 3.1772 0.0017 *
y2,S 0.0395 3.2643 0.0012 *
IT
n3 27.4971 2236.6942 0.0000 *
y3,W 0.0731 3.7321 0.0002 *
y3,F 0.0234 2.7753 0.0059 *
y3,S 0.0301 2.9962 0.0031 *
Impact on correlations
h h^ t-stat p-val
US-IT
n4 0.5818 39.6552 0.0000 *
y4,W 20.0161 21.7674 0.0119 *
y4,F 20.0011 20.2851 0.7762
y4,S 20.0028 20.5983 0.5502
UK-IT
n5 0.8334 122.7822 0.0000
y5,W 0.0108 2.5831 0.0104 *
y5,F 0.0037 2.0676 0.0398 *
y5,S 0.0048 2.0397 0.0225 *
UK-US
n6 0.5862 38.0473 0.0000 *
y6,W 20.0206 22.1631 0.0212 *
y6,F 0.0021 0.5152 0.6068
y6,S 20.0020 20.4141 0.6790
Columns: the parameter h (first), estimates h^ (second), value of the t-statistics
(third), p-value of the t-statistics (fourth) and :*’’ indicates significance of the
parameter at the 5% significance level (last).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067721.t002
Table 3. Left: the effect of the bad news indexes at the first
lag on volatility.
Impact on volatilities
h Y^12,1 t-stat p-val
US
y12,1US,W 0.0093 3.1230 0.0020 *
y12,1US,F 0.0002 0.1692 0.8663
y12,1US,S 20.0033 22.3871 0.0177 *
UK
y12,1UK,W 0.0076 2.2512 0.0253 *
y12,1UK,F 0.0002 0.1679 0.8676
y12,1UK,S 20.0019 21.1534 0.2501
IT
y12,1IT ,W 0.0073 2.1151 0.0354 *
y12,1IT ,F 0.0004 0.3061 0.7602
y12,1IT ,S 20.0023 21.455 0 0.1469
Impact on newspapers
h t-stat p-val
W
y21,1W ,US 20.32445 20.4851 0.6278
y21,1W ,UK 1.70194 2.4692 0.0142 *
y21,1W ,IT 20.96905 21.8552 0.0648
F
y21,1F ,US 22.0504 21.2334 0.2188
y21,1F ,UK 3.56990 2.0822 0.0384 *
y21,1F ,IT 0.00951 0.0072 0.9941
S
y21,1S,US,1
22.9694 22.1252 0.03462 *
y21,1S,UK 4.58829 3.1842 0.00164 *
y21,1S,IT
0.2066 0.1892 0.8501
Right: the effect of volatility at the first lag on the bad new indexes. Columns:
the parameter h (first), estimates h^ (second), value of the t-statistics (third), p-
value of the t-statistics (fourth) and ‘‘*’’ indicates significance of the parameter
at the 5% significance level (last).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067721.t003
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commentaries and academic debate. Even the tendency to blame
U.S. market responsibility and critically discuss the U.S. political
agenda against the crisis could explain the stronger sensitivity of
the Financial Times towards the development of the crisis (see also
[62]). It is worth noting that more than 80% of Financial Times
front pages in the period considered included an article or
commentary on the crisis, against 67% of Wall Street Journal.
On the other hand, the stronger concern for home investors
could have lead the Wall Street Journal to follow a less critical
stance and be more cautious in spreading bad news. In a recent
story on the U.S. press coverage of the financial crisis, [63]
suggested that American journalists were extremely cautious in
reporting bad news as it was clear that, in a situation of market
unpredictability and turmoil, any influential opinion or streamer
could have had a dramatic influence on market behaviour.
Secondly, it is worth noting that after the dramatic events of
September/October 2008, the financial press in the UK was
strongly criticized for boosterism and excessive embeddedness.
[60] explained that, in the autumn of 2008, a turning point was
achieved in the relationship between press and markets,
epitomized especially by the Financial Times. This was called
the ‘‘media’s moral compass’’ to mean that the relationship
between the press and the market shifted from a ‘‘cozy co-
dependence’’ to a more critical stance. This would explain why the
Financial Times suggested a pessimistic interpretation of economic
events.
The next step was to calculate the correlation between
newspapers (see Tab. 1). Results showed that newspaper
pessimism was significantly positively correlated. The more
positive correlations were between the Wall Street Journal and
Financial Times, and between the Wall Street Journal and Il
Sole24ore. If we consider the difference between periods of high
and low market volatility, it is worth noting that the higher
correlation was in high volatility periods between Wall Street
Journal and Financial Times, whereas correlations were not-
significant or negative in periods of low volatility. This meant that
in periods of higher market volatility, differences between Wall
Street Journal and Financial Times drastically diminished. Indeed,
in this period, these two leading newspapers basically conformed
both in terms of timing and intensity of pessimism. On the other
hand, significant differences persisted for other periods, where
market volatility was less pronounced.
Market Volatility and Correlation
Let Xi,t indicate the log-return at time t for FTSE (i~UK ),
DowJones (i~US) and MIB (i~IT ), the three stock market
financial indexes to which the three newspapers refer more
frequently. Let us calculate their volatility and correlation
dynamics by means of a generalized autoregressive conditional
heteroskedasticity (GARCH ) model (see [34]; [64]) with dynamic
conditional correlation (see also [35]). For the sake of simplicity,
we followed a non-parametric approach as follows:
Si,t~
1{l
1{lt
Xt{1
k~0
lk(Xi,t{k{ Xi,t)
2 ð3Þ
Sij,t~
1{l
1{lt
Xt{1
k~0
lk(Xi,t{k{ Xi,t)(Xj,t{k{ Xj,t) ð4Þ
Rij,t~
Sij,tﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Si,t
p ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Sj,t
p ð5Þ
for i,j~US,UK,IT where Xi,t was the empirical average over
Xi,t{tz1, . . . ,Xi,t, lw0 was a smoothing factor and tw0 was a
forgetting factor.
Fig. 2 shows the results of our non-parametric estimation
procedure. The first row shows the log-returns of the FTSE,
DowJones and MIB market indexes at a daily base for closing
values. The graphs in the second row show the level of log-
volatility (i.e. logSi,t) for each index. Although we did not report
data before 1st September 2008, it is worth noting that market
volatility significantly increased after September 2008. This is
evident when looking at the beginning of our sample (see the
graphs in the second row of Fig. 2). It is worth clarifying that this
was not due to a lack of data in the estimates at the beginning of
the sample. Indeed, the first estimate of the volatility was
calculated starting from a window of 60 initial observations,
which were not represented in the first row of Fig. 2. This means
that our sample fully reflected a period of significant market
turmoil. Results showed that market dynamics were similar. More
specifically, while the level of volatility was similar at the
beginning, at the end of the sample the Italian market showed
higher log-volatility than the UK and U.S. stock markets.
Furthermore, the level of correlation between the three market
indexes increased after September 2008 to quickly reach 0.6 for
DowJones and FTSE, 0.7 for MIB and DowJones and 0.9 for MIB
and FTSE. Secondly, our results showed that the correlation
between these three markets was positive. If we look at values
before and after the beginning of the period under observation, it
is worth noting that the UK and Italian markets were more highly
dependent than the U.S. and UK and U.S. and Italy respectively.
These results confirm certain previous empirical findings on the
higher correlation between markets during a financial crisis (e.g.,
[65]; [66]), especially in periods of higher volatility of the U.S.
Table 4. Pairwise and joint causality test p-values.
H0 : V B H0 : B V
US UK IT All US UK IT All
W 0.0012* 0.0036* 0.0426 0.0011* 0.0000* 0.0248* 0.0086* 0.0100*
F 0.0042* 0.0000* 0.0010* 0.0024* 0.1289 0.9817 0.8260 0.7534
S 0.0009* 0.0001* 0.0008* 0.0010* 0.4934 0.7773 0.8918 0.7251
All 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.7442 0.7573 0.7536 0.2550
The null hypotheses (H0) were as follows: volatility (V) did not cause (in the Granger sense) financial press pessimism (B) (V B, left panel), financial press did not cause
volatility (B V , right panel). ‘‘All’’ indicates all variables included in the test and ‘‘*’’ indicates that the null is rejected at the 5% significance level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067721.t004
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stock markets ([67]). Secondly, they would confirm recent findings
on the increasing interdependence of European stock markets
([68]).
Analysis
Let Vt~( logSUS,t, logSUK ,t, logSIT ,t)’ be the vector of log-
volatilities and Zt~(q(SUS,UK ,t), q(SUS,IT ,t), q(SUK ,IT ,t))’, with
q(x)~ log (1{x){ log (1zx), the vector of logistic-transformed
correlations. Let us define Mt~(Vt
0,Zt0)’. We examined the
relationship between bad news and the variance and correlation of
the three financial indexes. We considered static models as follows:
Mi,t~nizyi,FBF ,tzyi,WBW ,tzyi,SBS,tzei,t ð6Þ
with i~1, . . . ,6, and ei,t*N (0,j2i ) i.i.d. Vt,i.
Table 2 shows that all bad news coefficients were positive. This
means the any increase of pessimism by newspapers had a positive
impact on the volatility of markets. Obviously, the impact was not
the same for each newspaper or market. The Wall Street Journal
had a strong impact on all markets. The bad news of Wall Street
Journal and Financial Times had a significant impact (at 5%
significance) on the simultaneous level of log-volatility in all
markets (see the left panel in Tab. 2). Finally, Il Sole24Ore bad
news influenced the volatility of the UK and Italian stock markets.
As regards to market correlation, it is worth noting that Wall
Street Journal’s pessimism had a significant impact on all
correlations. Vice-versa, the Financial Times and Il Sole24Ore
had an impact only on their respective markets (see the right panel
of Tab. 2). This would confirm the leadership of Wall Street
Journal in influencing the stock market and its worldwide impact.
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that any increase of
pessimism by the Wall Street Journal had a negative impact on the
correlation between UK and Italian markets. This could be
explained by the fact that the Wall Street Journal mainly focused
on domestic affairs and negative news on the U.S. stock market
could have lead investors to move their investments towards other
markets or in general to explore a variety of investment strategies.
This could have contributed to generate heterogeneity in stock
market behaviour globally.
Statistical Causal Relations
To look at the causes of statistical relationships in more detail,
we performed a Granger-causality test that examined the lagged
dependence structure between bad news and market correlation
and volatility. This allowed us to verify whether bad news had any
predictive value for market volatility and correlation. We
considered each possible dependence between markets and
information, by setting Bt~(BF ,t,BW ,t,BS,t) and considering
VAR models.
Volatility
A joint test on the statistical causal relationships of volatility and
pessimism was based on the following VAR model of dimension 6
and order p:
Vt~Y10z
Xp
j~1
Y11,jVt{jzY12,jBt{j
 
ze1,t ð7Þ
Bt~Y20z
Xp
j~1
Y21,jVt{jzY22,jBt{j
 
ze2,t ð8Þ
with (e1,t,e2,t)*N 6(O6,J) i.i.d. Vt, Y100~(yUS ,yUK ,yIT ) and
Y20
0~(yF ,yW ,yS) were the intercept and the 3-dimensional
square matrices Y11,j , Y12,j , Y21,j , Y22,j , were the autoregressive
coefficients of the VAR6(p) model.
In order to disentangle the relation between volatility and the
press, we first looked at the statistical significance of the
relationship between volatility at time t and news at time t{k,
which depended on the matrices Y12,k, k~1, . . . ,p with elements
y12,kij , i~US,UK ,IT and j~F ,W ,S. Then, we looked at the
relation between bad news at time t and volatility at time t{k,
Table 5. Left: the effect of the bad news indexes at the first
lag on market correlations; Right: the effect of market
correlations at the first lag on the bad new indexes.
Impact on correlations
h W^12,1 t-stat p-val
US-UK
w12,1US{UK ,W 20.0023 22.3541 0.0193 *
w12,1US{UK ,F 0.0004 0.4882 0.6263
w12,1US{UK ,S 0.0016 0.7422 0.4589
US-IT
w12,1US{IT ,W 0.0005 0.2482 0.8044
w12,1US{IT ,F
20.0003 20.2901 0.7718
w12,1US{IT ,S 20.0029 22.7522 0.0064 *
UK-IT
w12,1UK{IT ,W 0.0001 0.1411 0.8881
w12,1UK{IT ,F 0.0004 1.1182 0.2646
w12,1UK{IT ,S 20.0005 21.1302 0.2598
Impact on newspaper
h W^21,1 t-stat p-val
W
w21,1W ,US{UK 24.6537 23.5851 0.0004 *
w21,1W ,US{IT 3.4669 2.8091 0.0053 *
w21,1W ,UK{IT 5.9194 4.0342 0.0000 *
F
w21,1F ,US{UK 22.3772 20.7242 0.4700
w21,1F ,US{IT
1.6567 0.5301 0.5962
w21,1F ,UK{IT 7.4877 2.0162 0.0449 *
S
w21,1S,US{UK
28.0680 22.9283 0.0037 *
w21,1S,US{IT 5.1940 1.9836 0.0485 *
w21,1S,UK{IT 12.8542 4.1272 0.0000 *
Columns: the parameter h (first), estimates h^ (second), value of the t-statistics
(third), p-value of the t-statistics (fourth) and ‘‘*’’ indicates the significance of
the parameter at the 5% significance level (last).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067721.t005
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which depended on elements y12,kij , i~F ,W ,S and j~US,UK ,IT
of the matrices Y21,k, k~1, . . . ,p. For our purpose and for the
sake of simplification, we have included only a subset of the VAR
coefficients, i.e., the elements of Y12,1 and Y21,1 only for the first
lag (see Table 3).
Results showed that Wall Street Journal bad news (lagged by
one period) significantly increased the volatility of the three market
indexes in the subsequent period (see the left panel in Tab. 3). This
is further confirmation of the leadership of this newspaper and its
worldwide impact. The bad news of other newspapers did not
have any significant impact on market volatility, with the
exception of the lagged relation between Il Sole24Ore bad news
and the volatility of the U.S. market. Considering the effect of
market volatility on bad news, it is worth noting that the FTSE
volatility had a significant and positive impact on the bad news of
each newspaper (see the right panel in Tab. 3). This would confirm
the recent worldwide importance of the London stock market.
Finally, it is worth noting that the volatility of the Dow Jones index
had a significant and negative impact on Il Sole24ore bad news.
We tested the hypothesis that volatility did not jointly
statistically cause, in a Granger sense, the bad-news indexes. To
look at the causal relationship between each market-specific
volatility and the three newspapers, we also tested separately the
hypothesis that neither each one of the three bad-news indexes,
nor all three indexes jointly considered statistically caused, in a
Granger sense, the market-specific volatility. To look at the
relationship between each newspaper and the three markets, we
did the same for newspaper bad news.
Tab. 4 shows the results of these joint and pairwise tests. First,
the p-value of the joint test in the last column and last row, in the
left panel, indicates that newspaper bad news was fully caused by
market turmoil. Therefore, stock market behaviour was the
essential source of bad news and newspapers did not have
unrealistically pessimistic stances. Secondly, if we look at the p-
values of almost all the pairwise causality tests (see the left panel),
this statistical causality direction from markets to newspapers was
true for all log-volatility and bad news indexes. On the other hand,
if we look at the p-values in the last column, last row in the right
panel, we should conclude that, in general, the financial press did
not determine market volatility. More specifically, results showed
that Wall Street Journal bad news alone had a strong statistical,
causal impact on market volatility (see the first row in the right
panel). Generally speaking, we could not predict market volatility
only by looking at financial press bad news.
Correlations
The VAR model of order q for bad-news indexes and
correlations was as follows:
Ct~W10z
Xq
j~1
W11,jCt{jzW12,jBt{j
 
zg1,t ð9Þ
Bt~W20z
Xq
j~1
W21,jCt{jzW22,jBt{j
 
zg2,t ð10Þ
with (g1,t,g2,t)*N 6(O6,S) i.i.d. Vt, where W10~(wUS,wUK ,wIT )
and were the intercept and Wij,k, i,j~1,2 k~1, . . . ,q, were the
autoregressive coefficients of the VAR6(1) model.
We examined the statistical significance of the relationship
between correlation at time t and bad news at time t{1, which
was given by the matrix W12,k with elements w
12,k
ij ,
i~US{UK,US{IT ,UK{IT and j~F ,W ,S. Then, we also
looked at the relationship between bad news at time t and
correlation at time t{1, which was given by the elements w21,kij ,
i~F ,W ,S and j~US{UK ,US{IT ,UK{IT of the matrix
W21,k. Note that, for the shortage of space, we included only the
autoregressive coefficients at the first lag, not all the estimated
coefficients of the VAR models (see Table 5).
Our results (see Table 5, left column) showed that Wall Street
Journal bad news (one lag) had a negative impact on the
correlation between U.S. and UK stock markets. Indeed, bad
news in the Wall Street Journal reduced the co-movement of these
markets. This could be explained in terms of outflow of capital
from the U.S. stock market and inflow into the UK market. On
the other hand, Financial Times bad news (one lag) had no
significant impact on market correlations. Il Sole24ore bad news
decreased the correlation between the U.S. and Italian stock
markets. The same explanation is a possible reason.
In addition, results (see Table 6, right column) showed that Wall
Street Journal bad news reflected all one lag correlations. An
increase in the correlation between the U.S. and UK stock markets
decreased the journal’s pessimism, whereas an increase in the
U.S.-IT and UK-IT correlations increased it. Furthermore, higher
(one lag) correlation between the UK and Italian stock markets
increased the pessimism of the Financial Times. Finally, all
correlations had a significant impact on Il Sole24Ore, similar to
the Wall Street Journal.
We performed a joint and pairwise Granger causality test to
rigorously asses the presence of causal relationships, as we did for
log-volatility. The last column, last row in the left panel of tab. 6
shows that all correlations had a Granger causal effect on all bad
news indexes. More specifically, while U.S.-IT stock market
correlation did not statistically cause the bad news index, UK-IT
Table 6. Pairwise and joint causality test p-values.
H0 : C B H0 : B C
US-IT UK-IT US-UK All US-IT UK-IT US-UK All
W 0.1017 0.0295* 0.0595 0.0001* 0.0121* 0.6951 0.0451* 0.0221*
F 0.6570 0.0100* 0.0108* 0.0223* 0.4739 0.3627 0.3627 0.6034
S 0.1026 0.0029* 0.0029* 0.0001* 0.9723 0.8733 0.8733 0.4141
All 0.1455 0.0026* 0.1780 0.0066* 0.0219* 0.4631 0.0208* 0.0423*
The null hypotheses (H0) were as follows: correlation (C) did not cause (in the Granger sense) financial press pessimism (B) (C B, left panel), financial press did not
cause correlation (B C, right panel). ‘‘All’’ indicates all variables are included in the test and ‘‘*’’ indicates the null is rejected at the 5% significance level.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067721.t006
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and U.S.-UK correlations had a Granger causal effect on the bad
news indexes of Financial Times and Il Sole24ore. Secondly,
looking at the last column, last row of the right panel, we can see
that the joint test did not reject the null hypothesis of the absence
of Granger causality between all bad news and correlation indexes.
Finally, results showed that Wall Street Journal bad news
determined U.S.-IT and U.S.-UK market correlation but not
that of UK-IT.
Therefore, any bad news in the Wall Street Journal predicted
correlation between the U.S. and the other stock markets.
Following certain peculiarities of Wall Street Journal as discussed
in Sect 3 (see Table 2), such as its worldwide recognized leadership
and strong focus on domestic affairs, this meant that investors
considered any bad news published in this influential newspaper as
a good prediction of market behaviour and promptly reacted by
drastically modifying their global investment strategies.
To sum up, we can say that results corroborated the first
hypothesis (H1), i.e., bad news published in the newspapers’
banner headlines had a significant influence on market volatility.
More specifically, we found that Wall Street Journal alone
contributed to market volatility. At the same time, our findings
also corroborated the second hypothesis (H2), which argued that
bad news could even influence the correlation of markets. More
specifically, we found that the Wall Street Journal had a significant
impact on market correlation, although different for different
markets involved and directions. H3 was not fully confirmed as it
claimed that, in period of financial turmoil, the press and markets
influenced each other, possibly contributing to a cascade of
pessimism. We found that market correlation and newspapers
exerted mutual influence only in specific cases. In particular, our
results showed that the Wall Street Journal strongly predicted
market correlation and volatility.
Our findings confirm the sociological argument of the reflexive
nature of stock markets. We found that media and markets are so
systematically related to extend this reflexivity also to qualitative,
subjective, broad picture information sources, whose true
economic value should be seriously questioned from a mainstream,
‘efficient market hypothesis’ approach. On the other hand,
especially if we look at the stronger influence of Wall Street
Journal, we can argue against the common sense belief that
Table 7. Robustness analysis of the dynamic analysis for close, high and low returns.
Impact on correlations
h h^
Close High Low
US-UK
20.0023 * 20.0047 * 20.0056 *
0.0004 20.0009 0.0006
0.0016 0.001 0.0005
US-IT
0.0005 20.0061 * 20.0072 *
20.0003 20.0003 0.0007
20.0029 * 20.0003 0.0003
UK-IT
0.0001 0.0121 * 0.0118 *
0.0004 0.0006 0.0008
20.0005 20.0018 20.0024
Impact on newspaper
h h^
Close High Low
W
24.6537 * 22.26757 * 22.7215 *
3.4669 * 1.9398 * 1.7358 *
5.9194 * 3.5517 * 4.0098 *
F
22.3772 24.7657 * 26.2373 *
1.6567 6.3302 * 5.6573 *
7.4877 * 9.2883 * 11.4475 *
S
28.068 * 22.9451 23.527 *
5.194 * 2.2545 2.3755
12.8542 * 7.0939 * 8.2052 *
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067721.t007
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newspapers would have over-exaggerated the dramatic events of
2008/2009 by imposing a critical stance which contributed to a
cascade and contagion of pessimism.
Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis
In order to corroborate our findings better, we performed
further statistical tests to verify if certain specificities of market
behaviour, such as downturn or upturn phases, could have had a
consequence on the predictive power of the bad news index on
market volatility and correlation. To do so, we re-estimated the
VAR models for volatility and correlation described in the
previous section by using alternatively the lowest and the highest
returns of each trading day in the calculation of volatility and
correlation. This was to estimate the impact of bad news on more
point-to-point market behaviour, where it is less likely that stock
markets fully reverberated all potential effects of a bad news.
Table 7 shows that Wall Street Journal bad news had a
significant impact on extreme returns (see High and Low
columns), so confirming previous findings. Furthermore, results
showed that the Wall Street Journal not only had a significant
effect on the U.S.-UK market correlation, but also on other
correlations. On the other hand, the effect of market correlation
on the Wall Street Journal bad news was more significant for
closing returns than for low and high returns. This meant that the
higher the correlation between markets, especially between the
U.S. and UK markets, the lower the bad news index of the Wall
Street Journal was. The situation with the Financial Times was
different. In this case, the effect of correlation for low and high
returns were statistically stronger than that of closing returns. Il
Sole24ore showed weak correlation effects in these downturn and
upturn cases. It is important to note that the FTSE-MIB
correlation had a strong effect on the Il Sole24ore bad news
independent of the type of market phases.
We then examined the robustness of the results on the choice of
the smoothing l factor in the estimation of the volatility and
correlation. Lower values of l corresponded to higher weights for
the most recent observations in the window considered. This leads
to volatility and correlation that were more sensitive to large
variations in returns. Thus, we verified whether these results
survived to the inclusion of a higher level of noise in the estimation
of variance and correlation. Table 8 shows that Wall Street
Journal bad news index was significant for the DJ-FTSE
correlation as in previous analysis, but that it was also significant
for DJ-MIB correlation. It is worth noting that, in this case, the
Financial Times became statistically significant for FTSE-MIB
correlation.
We also investigated the case of the Financial Times better,
trying to understand especially whether the relationship between
its bad news and stock market was influenced by a small number of
critical journalists. First, we distinguished two bad news indexes,
the first, BFC,t, for the group of central journalists and the second,
BFNC,t, for the residual group (non-central journalists). We
assumed that a journalist was central when he/she wrote more
than nine commentaries in periods of high newspaper’s pessimism.
We defined a period of high pessimism whenever the Financial
times bad news index was higher than two. These criteria gave us
nine central Financial Times journalists, such as Krishna Guha,
Francesco Guerrera (now at the Wall Street Journal), and Ralph
Atkins among others.
Fig. 3 shows that the two indexes for the two groups had
different dynamics and often moved in opposite directions leading
Table 8. Sensitivity analysis of the impact of different choices
of the smoothing factor on volatility and correlation
estimations.
Impact on correlations
h h^
l~0:99 l~0:95 l~0:90
US-UK
20.0023 * 20.015 * 20.0242 *
0.0004 0.0013 0.0032
0.0016 20.0003 20.0022
US-IT
0.0005 20.0175 * 20.0256 *
20.0003 0.001 0.0019
20.0029 * 20.0021 20.0039
UK-IT
0.0001 20.0003 0.0001
0.0004 0.0026 * 0.0047 *
20.0005 0.0017 0.0034
Impact on newspaper
h h^
l~0:99 l~0:95 l~0:90
W
24.6537 * 22.9682 * 1.7003 *
3.4669 * 0.1451 20.5796
5.9194 * 1.8159 * 1.1167 *
F
22.3772 21.9593 20.2972
1.6567 1.1568 20.0351
7.4877 * 6.1841 * 2.9076 *
S
28.068 * 20.7873 0.4785
5.194 * 21.3902 * 21.6124 *
12.8542 * 3.63475 * 1.9182 *
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067721.t008
Figure 3. Financial Times bad news index per group of
journalists from 1st September 2008 to 1st September 2009
on a daily base: central journalists are in black solid lines, non-
central journalists are in blue dashed lines. Peaks of bad news are
indicated with vertical dashed lines.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067721.g003
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to a negative correlation 20.2305 (statistically significant at the
5% level). We then considered Vt~( logSUS,t, logSUK ,t,
logSIT ,t)’ and Zt~(q(SUS,UK ,t), q(SUS,IT ,t), q(SUK ,IT ,t))’, with
q(x)~ log (1{x){ log (1zx) and Mt~(Vt
0,Zt 0)’ as in the
previous sections and estimated.
Mi,t~nizyi,FCBFC,tzyi,FNCBFNC,t
zyi,WBW ,tzyi,SBS,tzei,t
ð11Þ
with i~1, . . . ,6, and ei,t*N (0,j2i ) i.i.d. Vt,i.
Table 9 shows that the bad news index of the group of central
journalists had a significant impact (at the 5% significance level) on
the contemporaneous level of log-volatility in all markets (see the
left panel). On the contrary, there was no relationship between the
pessimism of non-central journalists and market volatility and
correlation. This could indicate that the opinion of certain
influential commentators was more considered by the market
and revealed a specific strategy of the newspaper, i.e., to assign
commentaries to more critical journalists in specific phases of the
crisis.
Discussion
In an interesting personal account on 2008/2009 events, Peter
S. Goodman, now executive business editor of the Huffington
Post, past national correspondent for the New Work Times,
reported that:
‘‘Inside our newsroom in midtown Manhattan, we understood
that were were not merely passive chroniclers of external events.
The sportswriter can describe what is happening on the field from
a dispassionate distance, without imagining that the words he types
may somehow influence the events he is witnessing. Not so for
those of us writing about the financial crisis: were were effectively
on the field while the game was still under way. Investors and
markets and ordinary people would move their money in reaction
to what we and other major media were reporting, and this would
in turn affect the policy climate, the perception of need for
emergency measures, the politics of the debate over those
measures, and the public mood, which then reverberated back
on everything else’’ ([63], p. 110).
This personal view testifies to the reflexive nature of markets
and the limitation of the mantra of the market efficiency
hypothesis. Our findings showed that the idea of reflexivity may
contemplate that, in periods of crisis and market unpredictability,
even distant information, subjective opinion and economically
irrelevant facts may influence market behaviour. Probably, this is
due to the fact that today economic, information, technological,
and social systems are more strongly and globally coupled than in
the past. This means that investors cannot easily predict future
outcomes and tend to extend their social reflexivity towards non-
operational, non strictly market related events and processes, e.g.,
by considering that general events, board picture information and
the opinion of influential newspapers might have an informative
value for markets.
This findings has interesting implications for the financial press.
Indeed, following Goodman’s argument, a competent, reliable and
responsible information is crucial for markets to work well,
especially in periods of financial turmoil. This means that it is
important to carry out more serious investigation on the ethics and
responsibility of the financial press to establish new standards of
conduct and better incentives and sanctions to support reliable
information (e.g., [61]; [14]). Secondly, our findings showed that
the increasing globalization of financial markets and their
Table 9. Left: the effect of the Financial Times central and
non-central journalists (parameter yi,FC , i~1, . . . ,3) on
volatility; Right: the effect of the Financial Times central and
non-central journalists (parameter yi,FC , i~4, . . . ,6) on
correlations.
Impact on volatilities
h h^ t-stat p-val
US
n1 27.1128 2169.9311 0.0000 *
y1,W 0.1284 4.7021 0.0001 *
y1,FC 0.0266 3.1034 0.0021 *
y1,FNC 0.0266 1.4692 0.1431
y1,S 0.0354 5.3513 0.000
UK
n2 27.1553 2182.3652 0.0000 *
y2,W 0.1127 4.4023 0.0000 *
y2,FC 0.0356 3.1587 0.0018 *
y2,FNC 0.0367 1.5176 0.1306
y2,S 0.0678 5.7961 0.0000 *
IT
n3 26.8698 2236.6942 0.0000 *
y3,W 0.0654 2.9420 0.0036 *
y3,FC 0.0273 2.7861 0.0057 *
y3,FNC 0.0298 1.4161 0.1515
y3,S 0.0509 5.0062 0.0000 *
Impact on correlations
h h^ t-stat p-val
US-IT
n4 0.6908 42.9045 0.0000 *
y4,W 20.0029 20.2801 0.6871
y4,FC 20.0018 0.3921 0.6954
y4,FNC 20.0055 20.5602 0.5763
y4,S 20.0073 21.5322 0.1276
UK-IT
n5 0.8347 77.1971 0.0000
y5,W 0.0148 2.1081 0.0104 *
y5,FC 0.0063 2.0330 0.0398 *
y5,FNC 0.0007 0.1091 0.0398
y5,S 0.0031 0.9532 0.0225
UK-US
n6 0.7198 38.0473 0.0000 *
y6,W 20.0208 22.0301 0.0211 *
y6,FC 0.0028 0.5631 0.5742
y6,FNC 0.0110 1.0191 0.3091
y6,S 20.0063 21.2051 0.2297
Columns: the parameter h (first), estimates h^ (second), value of the t-statistics
(third), p-value of the t-statistics (fourth) and ‘‘*’’ indicates significance of the
parameter at the 5% significance level (last).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0067721.t009
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correlation in times of crisis require the press to truly cover the
international dimension of business and be less parochial. This
challenges the quality of the press coverage of global market
dynamics and indicates the need for improving the public
understanding of the intricate mechanisms of stock markets.
Finally, certain limitations of our work should be considered.
First, we did not study the influence of the financial press on stock
markets but only that of bad news. This gave us a narrow view of
the link between the press and markets. Secondly, we studied the
relationship of the financial press and stock markets in an
‘‘abnormal’’ market phase, where market behaviour was strongly
subjected to irrational expectation and social mood. We inten-
tionally selected this period as we expected that, in these situations,
the pessimism of the financial press and its cross-sectoral dynamics
could help us to understand the crisis better. While our results do
not contribute to a general theory of the link of press and markets,
they can provide important insights to understand the ‘social
construction’ of pessimism between press and markets.
Moreover, it is also important to note that press pessimism and
market behaviour could also be conditioned by other media, such
as the new social media and the Internet (e.g., [31]). Comparing
behaviour and impact of various media would be essential to
provide a more precise analysis of the 2008/2009 crisis and draw
more general remarks of the complex ways through which market
sentiment tends to form today (e.g., see [30]). The same holds for
the idea of including other newspapers and markets, which may
help us to have a more complete picture of the recent crisis and its
global dimension.
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